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I INTRODUCTION
It is a given that circumstances change: often drastically and without any
prior warning. For this reason, the prudent negotiator should include a
hardship clause in his or her contract to provide for the possible eventuality
that circumstances might change during that contract’s currency. Not every
contracting party is legally proficient, however, and no one can fully foresee
the future. Unfortunately for those who have concluded their contracts in
South Africa, our law is not amenable to this consideration: contractual
certainty is the dominant value in the local jurisprudence and there is little
scope for the party afflicted by a change in circumstances to argue for
discharge on these grounds.1 If performance has actually become impossible
due to a change in circumstances, the contract will be void,2 but should the
impact on the contract fall short of this, the contract remains binding.3
Consider now the situation where there has been a fundamental alteration in
the equilibrium of the contract due to a change in circumstances.4 This may
either be because the purpose for which a contract has been concluded has
been frustrated; that is where the foundation of the contract, in the sense of a
motivating factor common to both parties, has fallen away subsequent to the
conclusion of the contract. Alternatively, the cost of performance may have
* BA LLB LLM (Cape Town).
† I would like to thank my father, Prof Dale Hutchison, as well as Prof Tjakie
Naudé and Prof Rochelle le Roux for their very helpful comments on drafts of this
article.
1 The position whereby public policy is seen as valuing contractual certainty first
and foremost seems to be changing, however. See Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (5) SA
323 (CC); Breedenkamp v Standard Bank of SA Ltd 2009 (5) SA 304 (GSJ) and 2009 (6)
SA277 (GSJ).
2 Peters, Flamman & Co v Kokstad Municipality 1919AD 427 at 434.
3 See, e g, Hersman v Shapiro 1926 TPD 367 at 375–7.
4 This formulation is partly borrowed from the definition of hardship in the
Unidroit Principles of International Commercial Contracts at art 6.2.2 (hereafter
‘Unidroit PICC’).
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increased so drastically that the above test of fundamental alteration of the
equilibrium of the contract is said to have been met. In either case in South
African law the contract remains binding.5
I have argued in a separate article for a recognition of the supposition in
futuro, possibly in the guise of an imputed tacit resolutive condition.6 A
supposition is present where there is a belief common to both parties that a
certain state of affairs exists.7 Should the belief prove false, the contract is
void.8 This is trite where the supposition relates to the past or present, but
according to the Supreme Court of Appeal does not apply where the state of
affairs relates to the future.9 A supposition as to the future or an implied
condition would address precisely the issue of the collapse of the common
motivational foundation of a contract, since this would discharge the contract
where a common belief that a future event would take place proved false. In
the English jurisdiction (and indeed in many other legal systems based on
English law) the type of role I have advocated for the supposition in futuro is
already covered by the doctrine of frustration, more particularly frustration of
purpose. This article will thus continue the argument for a doctrine to deal
with changed circumstances, invoking comparative law in the form of the
doctrine of frustration as support. Frustration, I will attempt to show, is a
doctrine dealing with changed circumstances, rather than simply impossibil-
ity. This broader conception allows frustration to bring a measure of justice to
the nature of business in the modern commercial world, discharging a party
where a significant change of circumstances has made performance of his or
her obligation something radically different from what had been undertaken
at the outset.10 It should be noted in addition that the English doctrine of
frustration is not the most interventionist mechanism of dealing with the
problem of changed circumstances. While it is more lenient than French law,
which does not allow discharge for changed circumstances in private law
matters, it is stricter than German law, which allows judicial adjustment of
5 For frustration of purpose in South African law, see Van Reenen Steel (Pty) Ltd v
Smith NO 2002 (4) SA 264 (SCA) para 8. For increase in cost of performance — the
situation of commercial impracticability — see MacDuff & Co Ltd (In Liquidation) v
Johannesburg Consolidated Investment Co Ltd 1924AD 573 at 605–6.
6 Andrew Hutchison ‘What’s so wrong with Williams v Evans? An examination of
the concept of the supposition in futuro’ (2008) 125 SALJ 441.
7 See for example: Schalk van der Merwe, L F van Huyssteen, M F B Reinecke &
G F Lubbe Contract: General Principles 3 ed (2007) 285.
8 Ibid.
9 Van Reenen Steel supra note 5 para 8.
10 This notion of a change of circumstances having rendered a contract something
different from what was initially undertaken, is traditionally expressed in English law
by the maxim: ‘non haec in foedera veni’ (it was not this that I promised to do). See by
way of example: Davis Contractors Ltd v Fareham Urban District Council [1956] AC 696
at 728.
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the contract.11 The same is true in the international trade context under the
Unidroit Principles of International Commercial Contracts.12
This article will contrast the conventional South African defence of
impossibility with the doctrine of frustration. In particular, there will be focus
on the notion of frustration of purpose, since this aspect of the doctrine is the
functional equivalent of the South African supposition in futuro. ‘Frustra-
tion’ is the broader category in English law, whereas ‘frustration of purpose’
refers to a particular problem within the frustration context, where the
purpose of the parties, or common foundation of the transaction, has fallen
away. In this situation the value of performance to the disadvantaged party
decreases dramatically.13 There are also several reported cases in South Africa
where a court has been faced with precisely the issue of what to do where the
foundation of a contract has collapsed subsequent to its conclusion: in an
effort to make the impossibility defence cover this type of situation, judges
have resorted to the English doctrine of frustration. The use of this broader
concept by our municipal courts implies an expansion of the Roman Dutch
notion of impossibility. These past inferences of the doctrine of frustration
will also be evaluated.
The aim of this article ultimately is to examine the status of the defence of
frustration of purpose, particularly in the English law, but also with reference
to other countries such as the United States and Australia, which employ a
similar doctrine. South Africa’s conservative stance will thus be compared
with that of several of the world’s leading economies. In sum, the article will
attempt to evaluate the extent to which the refusal of our municipal courts to
accommodate a defence based on changed circumstances is out of line with
international trends.
II THE ENGLISH DOCTRINE OF FRUSTRATION
Frustration is a doctrine typical of the English common law in that it has
evolved incrementally over many years and, to a certain extent, in an almost
ad hoc fashion. The aim of the doctrine is to ‘. . . escape from the injustice
[which] would result from enforcement of a contract in its literal terms after a
significant change of circumstances’.14 Frustration is thus a ground for
discharge of a contract struck by changed circumstances.
The frustration defence dates back to 1863 and the case of Taylor v
Caldwell.15 Prior to that contracts were regarded as absolute in English law
11 See in general Hannes Rösler ‘Hardship in German codified private law — in
comparative perspective to English, French and international contract law’ 2007
European Review of Private Law 483.
12 See arts 6.2.1–3 of the Unidroit PICC.
13 For a discussion of what frustration of purpose entails, and for a comparison of
this concept with its opposite, impracticability, the reader is referred to Guenter
Treitel Frustration and Force Majeure (2004) chs 6 and 7, especially at 309.
14 J Lauritzen AS v Wijsmuller BV (The Super Servant Two) [1990] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 1 at
8.
15 (1863) B&S 826.
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and even impossibility was no ground for discharge. In Paradine v Jane, the
classic authority for absolute contracts, it was held:
‘When the party by his own contract creates a duty or charge upon himself, he
is bound to make it good, if he may, notwithstanding any accident by inevitable
necessity, because he might have provided against it by his contract. And
therefore if the lessee covenant to repair a house, though it be burned by
lightning, or thrown down by enemies, yet he ought to repair it.’16
In Paradine’s case a tenant was held bound to pay outstanding rental despite
the fact that he had been prevented from occupying the premises for two
years during the currency of the lease. This was due to the occupation of the
area by an invading army. Although he had derived no benefit from his
contract because it had been objectively impossible to occupy the rented
premises, the court refused to discharge the contract. Two centuries later, the
courts relented and frustration was born in Taylor’s case. Here a music hall and
surrounding gardens had been hired out to the defendant for the purpose of
holding concerts over several specified days. When the music hall was
destroyed by fire, the contract was held to have been discharged. In reaching
his decision, it is worth noting that Blackburn J relied on civil law authority,
particularly Pothier’s Treatise on the Law of Obligations, to the effect that
impossibility would discharge a contract.17
Blackburn J’s exception to absolute contracts was seized upon by the
English courts and entered a phase of expansion. It was extended beyond
cases of absolute impossibility to a broader class of cases which had merely
been affected by changed circumstances. Perhaps the most famous case
example of this expansion was Krell v Henry,18 one of the so-called
‘Coronation cases’. The facts which gave rise to these cases were that Edward
VII was to be crowned King of England on 26 June 1902, and various means
of honouring him were devised. One of these was a procession through the
streets of London. Henry had hired a flat overlooking Pall Mall for the day of
the procession: it was the common assumption of both lessor and lessee that
the procession would be viewable from this flat and the rent was correspond-
ingly high. On 24 June, however, the king-to-be fell ill with appendicitis and
the procession was cancelled. Henry refused to proceed with the lease
agreement and Krell sued for the rental due. The court held, however, that
because the viewing of the procession had been the common foundation of
the contract, its purpose was frustrated and hence it was discharged.19
This was an important development: previously the doctrine of frustration
had been similar to the civil law notion of impossibility, but with the
16 Paradine v Jane (1647)Aleyn 26 at 27.
17 Taylor v Caldwell supra note 15 at 833–4. This debt to the civil law was acknowl-
edged by Vaughan Williams LJ in Krell v Henry [1903] 2 KB 740 at 747–8, where he
described frustration as a ‘principle of the Roman law which has been adopted and
acted on in many English decisions’.
18 Krell v Henry supra note 17.
19 Ibid at 754.
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expansion to include frustration of purpose, the doctrine became far broader.
The finding in Krell v Henry struck at the root of contractual certainty,
however, and Treitel notes that following this bold expansion the courts in
England have hardly ever applied the ratio of this case.20 This concept of
frustration of purpose is central to the inquiry of this article, since it permits
discharge of a contract following a significant change of circumstances, but
which falls short of impossibility. I will thus expand on this topic briefly
before continuing with the synopsis of frustration in general.
The first point to note about Krell v Henry is that the judgment of Vaughan
Williams LJ in that case stressed that the foundation of the contract which is
alleged to have fallen away must be common to both parties. His lordship
distinguished the scenario where a cab driver is engaged to take a person to
see a horse race in another town. The subsequent occurrence of the horse
race is fundamental only to the passenger: to the cab driver he is just another
passenger, even if the price has been suitably enhanced due to the derby
nature of the race. Should the race be cancelled, the passenger would still
have to pay.21
It should also be noted that not all the Coronation cases were decided in
favour of the consumer. In Herne Bay Steam Boat Co v Hutton22 the defendant
had hired a ship to take his guests to see the Naval Review on 28 June 1902,
which was to accompany the Coronation, and the following day to take the
party around the fleet and the Isle of Wight. The cancellation of the Naval
Review was held not to discharge the contract, since this was not the
foundation of the agreement.23 All three judges in this case made the point
that the contract was to hire the ship for a voyage, not for a particular purpose
incidental to that voyage.24 Vaughan Williams LJ, who was also on the bench
for this case, stated that it was analogous to his earlier example of the
cab-driver.25 Though these two Coronation cases may not be easy to
reconcile with one another, the Herne Bay case does demonstrate Treitel’s
argument: immediately after the creation of the frustration of purpose
defence by the English Courts, they were already limiting its application.
Another group of cases which dealt with frustration of purpose were the
so-called ‘black-out’ cases. During World War One, legislation was passed in
England which prevented the illumination of street lights in cities to avoid
enemy detection. The local authorities then tried to escape from contracts
which they had entered into with power companies to keep these street
lights lit. Clearly the purpose of such a contract had been frustrated. In Leiston
Gas Co Ltd v Leiston-cum-Sizewell Urban District Council26 the plaintiff gas
20 Treitel op cit note 13 at 346. See this work for a detailed account of the doctrine
of frustration as a whole, and the concept of frustration of purpose in particular.
21 Krell v Henry supra note 17 at 750–1.
22 [1903] 2 KB 683.
23 Ibid at 689.
24 Ibid at 688–93.
25 Ibid at 689.
26 [1916] 2 KB 428.
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company had contracted to provide and maintain street lights, powered by
their gas plant for a period of five years, beginning in 1911. In 1915,
government regulations prohibited the lighting of such lamps. The defendant
local authority then tried to argue that the contract had been frustrated, while
the plaintiff sued to recover the amounts outstanding under the remainder of
the contract period. While performance of part of the contract had become
illegal, remaining parts, such as maintaining the lights, remained possible. It
was argued by the defendant that the purpose of these parts of the contract
had been frustrated. The Court of Appeal held for the plaintiff: the
performance of the maintenance functions of the gas company remained
possible and it could not be said that the foundation of the contract had fallen
away.27
The advent of World War Two saw the enactment of similar legislation,
but this time the Japanese threat saw the extension of ‘black-out’ regulations
to parts of the United States and Australia. The legal systems of these two
countries both recognise a doctrine of frustration, with the English version
providing an authoritative model. The US case was 20th Century Lites v
Goodman,28 where the plaintiff company had leased neon sign installations to
defendant, who operated a ‘drive-in’ restaurant. When the US government
ordered all outside lighting on the West coast to be blacked out at night in
August 1942, the purpose for which the lease had been entered into by the
defendant was frustrated. The defendant offered to return the signage to the
plaintiff, but this offer was refused and he then defaulted on the rent. The
plaintiff’s action to recover outstanding rent was denied by the Los Angeles
Superior Court, which held that the contract had been frustrated. This
decision was based on certain US case law, as well as the first Restatement of the
Law, Contracts, which expressly recognised the defence of frustration of
purpose in its section 288.29
A different result was reached in Scanlan’s New Neon Ltd v Tooheys Ltd,30
the leading Australian ‘black-out’ case. Here there was again a lease of various
neon signs for a five year period against payment of a monthly rental. This
contract, however, stipulated that ‘rental shall be payable, except as herein
otherwise provided, whether or not the sign shall be used or operated by the
lessee’.31 When the use of outdoor lighting was prohibited at any time, day or
night, in New South Wales in January 1942, the defendants argued that their
contract had been frustrated. The High Court of Australia, however, refused
to discharge the defendant’s obligations. Treitel suggests that the difference
between the 20th Century Lites and the Scanlan’s New Neon case may be that
the specific wording of the contract in the Australian version did not permit
27 Ibid at 431–40.
28 149 P 2d 88 (1944).
29 This rule is maintained in the American Law Institute Restatement of the Law,
Second: Contracts 2d (1981) § 265.
30 (1943) 67 CLR 169.
31 Ibid at 183.
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an argument of frustration.32 The Scanlan’s New Neon case cites largely
English precedent in reaching its verdict, and Krell v Henry is discussed at
length.33 This case was, however, distinguished:
‘If, however, the ‘‘basis of the contract’’ theory is applied in the present cases,
there is no evidence which takes the court beyond the terms of the contracts.
From those terms it is clear without further evidence that the parties expected
that the signs would be used as illuminated signs. But they made an express
provision that rent was to be paid whether the signs were used or not. The
court, therefore, would not be justified in holding that the basis of the contract
was that no rent should be paid if the signs were not used.’34
It should be noted, though, that there is precedent for a frustration of
purpose type argument succeeding in Australia. In Brisbane City Council v
Group Projects Pty Ltd35 a developer owned certain land on which it wanted to
develop a township. The land was incorrectly zoned for this purpose, so the
developer entered into a contract with the city council whereby it would
provide basic infrastructure, such as water and electricity to this land in
exchange for the council rezoning it. After the conclusion of the contract,
but before the infrastructure had been installed, the land was expropriated for
the purpose of building a school. Much of the work necessary for the
infrastructure to be provided was external to the land and could still be done,
but this was no longer necessary, since the school would not have the same
demands as a township. The developer was held to be discharged from its
obligation to do the works. One of the judges, Stephen J, held that this was
due to frustration.36 Stephen J noted in his judgment that this case is closer to
Krell v Henry on its facts and, while it may have failed the ‘change in the
obligation’ test as propounded in Davis Contractors Ltd v Fareham Urban District
Council,37 it still gave rise to frustration:
‘But I do not understand his Lordship [Lord Radcliffe in Davis Contractors] to
say that without change in obligation there can be no frustration: it is ‘‘the
occurrence of any unexpected event that, as it were, changes the face of things’’,
that give [sic] rise to frustration.’38
Thus, from this brief synopsis of cases where the purpose of the contract
has been frustrated we can see that a narrower approach is adopted in the
English cases than the American ones. Australia seems to follow English law
quite closely and also adopts a narrow approach to frustration of purpose.
Outside of the US, where the doctrine is recognised by statute and by the
32 Treitel op cit note 13 at 328.
33 See in particular the judgment of Latham CJ at 192–4.
34 Scanlan’s New Neon Ltd supra note 30 at 194.
35 (1979) 145 CLR 143.
36 Ibid at 163.
37 Supra note 10. This is arguably the leading UK case on frustration, which pos-
ited the test for frustration as being whether there had been a radical change in the
obligation concerned (at 728). See further below.
38 Brisbane City Council supra note 35 at 161. The inserted quote is from Krell v
Henry supra note 17.
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(second) Restatement of the Law, Contracts, there appears to be a reluctance to
interfere with the allocation of risk in the contracts of the parties concerned.
What the cases do tell us, though, is that in an appropriate case the courts do
have the capacity to take account of the frustration of a common motivating
factor.
The doctrine of frustration in English law is wider than simply the
principle expressed in Krell v Henry, however. It has already been shown that
frustration also covers cases of actual impossibility. Frustration in addition
deals with cases of legal impossibility, where the performance of a contract
becomes impossible subsequent to its conclusion due either to a change in
the law (such as the introduction of a new statute)39 or a change in
circumstances (such as when a declaration of war upon a foreign country
prevents trade with that country40). These are the major categories covered
by frustration. A final category, prominent in the American law of changed
circumstances, needs to be examined. This is the issue of impracticability,
where performance is not strictly impossible, but has become more difficult
or more expensive.41 This is described by Treitel as being the ‘mirror-image’
of frustration of purpose.42 With frustration of purpose it is generally the
consumer of goods or services who defaults, based on the failure of a
common motivating assumption. With impracticability it is the supplier who
seeks to escape, based on increased expense or difficulty in performance. An
important difference between these two situations is that with frustration of
purpose the potential loss is limited to the contract price, whereas with
impracticability the loss is (in theory) infinite.
In English law impracticability is generally speaking not a ground for
discharge. Support for this statement can be found in the judgment of Lord
Loreburn in Tennants (Lancashire) Ltd v CS Wilson & Co Ltd:43
‘The argument that a man can be excused from performance of his contract
when it becomes ‘‘commercially’’ impossible, . . . seems to me a dangerous
39 Denny, Mott & Dickson v James B Fraser & Co Ltd [1944] AC 265. In this case
performance under a contract for the sale of timber was frustrated when war time
regulations restricting the trade in timber were promulgated.
40 Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v Fairbairn, Lawson Combe Barbour Ltd [1943] AC 32. Here
a contract for the sale of machinery was frustrated: the goods were to be delivered to a
port in Poland, but this was occupied by German forces in 1939, subsequent to the
conclusion of the contract, but prior to delivery.
41 The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) in America provides for impracticabil-
ity at § 2–615: ‘[E]xcept so far as a seller may have assumed a greater obligation . . .
delay in delivery or non-delivery in whole or in part by a seller . . . is not a breach of
his duty under a contract for sale if performance as agreed has become impracticable
by the occurrence of a contingency the non-occurrence of which was a basic assump-
tion on which the contract was made. . . .’ Impracticability is also provided for in
Restatement, Second, Contracts at § 261.
42 Treitel op cit note 13 at 309.
43 [1917]AC 495.
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contention, which ought not to be admitted unless the parties have plainly
contracted to that effect.’44
Indeed there is a dictum which states that an increase in price would have
to be at least a hundredfold before discharge could be permitted on this
ground.45 In the leading case of Davis Contractors,46 building contractors had
undertaken to build 78 houses in eight months for a price of £94 000.
Because of labour shortages, however, the project took 22 months to
complete and cost £115 000. The building contractors then tried to argue
that the contract had been frustrated and that they were hence entitled to
renegotiate the contract price. The court disagreed, holding that this type of
increase in price was foreseeable in commercial undertakings.47 As Treitel
points out, however, the increase in price in this case was less than 23 per cent
of the contract price, which even in the US would not have brought the
doctrine of impracticability into play.48 Defences based on increased diffi-
culty in shipping due to the closure of the Suez Canal49 and due to
inflation-based increases in price have likewise been rejected.50 In the
context of international trade, Brunner has suggested that for frustration of
purpose the potential loss under the contract must amount to 80 to 100 per
cent of the contract price to invite discharge, and under impracticability the
potential loss must be in the order of 100 to 125 per cent.51
Given then that the doctrine of frustration covers a variety of scenarios and
has been developed largely on an ad hoc basis, what is the theoretical
foundation on which this doctrine rests? Initially the basis of frustration was
seen as being an implied term between the contracting parties that a given
state of affairs would continue to exist.52 This construction harks back to the
medieval concept of the clausula rebus sic stantibus, which similarly allowed
for discharge of a contract based on an implied reservation to every promise
44 Ibid at 510.
45 Brauer & Co (Great Britain) Ltd v James Clark (Brush Materials) Ltd [1952] All ER
497 at 501 (per Lord Denning).
46 Supra note 10.
47 Ibid at 730–1.
48 Treitel op cit note 13 at 287.
49 Tsakiroglou & Co Ltd v Noblee Thorl GmbH [1962]AC 93.
50 British Movietonews Ltd v London and District Cinemas Ltd [1952] AC 166 at 185.
For a contrary decision see, however, Staffordshire Area Health Authority v South
Staffordshire Waterworks Co [1978] 1 WLR 1387, where an 18-fold increase in the cost
of supply of water was held to discharge this obligation due to frustration. This case is
distinguishable, however, since it involved a long-term contract of indefinite dura-
tion. See Treitel op cit note 13 at 296–300.
51 Christoph Brunner Force Majeure and Hardship under General Contract Principles —
Exemption for Non-Performance in International Arbitration (2009) 432.
52 Tamplin Steamship Co Ltd v Anglo Mexican Petroleum Products Co Ltd [1916] 2 AC
397 at 403–4.
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that circumstances remain unchanged.53 The implied term approach was
attacked on the grounds that the change of circumstances ultimately
frustrating the contract was unforeseen and hence not within the contempla-
tion of the parties at the time of contracting.54 In what has become a classic
statement of the theoretical basis of frustration, Lord Radcliffe stated the
following in Davis Contractors:
‘[F]rustration occurs whenever the law recognizes that without default of either
party a contractual obligation has become incapable of being performed
because the circumstances in which performance is called for would render it a
thing radically different from that which was undertaken by the contract.’55
This objective standard of the ‘radical change in the obligation’ has been
subsequently accepted by the House of Lords as the test for whether
frustration has occurred.56 This terminology reflects the fact that frustration is
a fairly broad doctrine, dealing not only with impossibility, but can be read
beyond that also into the realm of changed circumstances. One is left with
the impression, though, that while this was intended as a theoretical basis for
the doctrine of frustration to replace the implied term approach, it is arguably
just a test for whether frustration occurs. A truer statement of the basis of the
doctrine of frustration was made by Lord Simon in National Carriers Ltd v
Panalpina Ltd,57 where he stated that frustration occurs when ‘the law
declares both parties to be discharged from further performance’ (following
an unexpected and significant change in the obligation). Frustration thus
operates ex lege to discharge obligations in appropriate circumstances.
There are, however, certain important limitations to this doctrine, and
which touch on issues of the allocation of contractual risk. These must now
be considered. First, the frustration pleaded must not be self-induced. In The
Eugenia58 a ship was chartered to carry a cargo from Russia to India. A clause
in the contract stated that the ship was not to be ordered into a war zone
without first obtaining the permission of her owners. The ship was
nevertheless ordered to proceed via the Suez Canal during the 1956 crisis in
the Middle East, and the ship was detained by the Egyptian authorities. The
charterers then argued that the contract had been frustrated. It was held,
however, that the delay was ultimately caused by the ordering of the Eugenia
into a war-zone in breach of contract.59 Hence, the frustration was
self-induced.
53 See Andrew Hutchison ‘Change of circumstances in contract law: The clausula
rebus sic stantibus’ (2009) 72 THRHR 60 for a more detailed analysis of this doctrine by
the present author.
54 Davis Contractors supra note 10 at 728.
55 Ibid.
56 See Jack Beatson Anson’s Law of Contract (2002) at 544n78 for a comprehensive
list of authorities.
57 [1981]AC 675 at 700F–G.
58 Ocean Tramp Tankers v V/O Sovfracht [1964] 2 QB 226.
59 Ibid at 237.
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In addition, the frustrating event should not have been foreseen or
foreseeable by the parties concerned, nor should the frustration have been
caused by the fault of the party pleading this defence. In a way both these
further qualifications can be seen as being related to the exclusion of
self-induced frustration. The issue of foreseeability relates to the allocation of
contractual risk: should a contract be held to have been frustrated by a
foreseeable eventuality, this would interfere in the contract to the extent that
the price and other terms were based upon the foreseeable risks.60 Similarly,
what if the frustration was not deliberately self-induced, but resulted from a
party’s negligence? In The Super Servant Two Bingham LJ stated that
negligence would preclude a plea of frustration.61 This statement was,
however, obiter. McKendrick notes that the issue of whether a contract may
be frustrated by an event caused by the defendant’s negligence has never been
finally resolved.62 Treitel is of the view that negligence should exclude
frustration.63
Finally: what are the effects of a finding of frustration? The effect of
frustration is to bring a contract to an end ‘forthwith’ and ‘automatically’.64
Discharge of the obligation occurs from the time of the frustrating event (ex
nunc): any future obligations are extinguished.65 This begs the question:
what about performance already tendered? Initially, the position was that
obligations accrued before the frustrating event remained binding, even if the
reciprocal performance was discharged.66 This position resulted in consider-
able injustice and was overruled by the House of Lords in The Fibrosa.67 The
Legislature then intervened with the Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act
1943 to prevent unjustified enrichment of parties following a finding of
frustration. Thus today sums paid before frustration may be reclaimed, and
obligations to pay at the time of frustration are discharged.
In sum: the English doctrine of frustration deals with changes in circum-
stances beyond mere impossibility. The doctrine is an all-or-nothing one,
however, and should frustration strike, the contract will not be renegotiated,
but discharged. In addition, although the English courts were initially willing
to extend the doctrine, today the emphasis is on the proper allocation of risks.
This prompted Bingham LJ to assert in The Super Servant Two that ‘the
doctrine is not to be lightly invoked, must be kept within very narrow limits
and ought not to be extended’.68 The emerging picture from a South African
perspective is that the doctrine is not so far removed from our own notion of
supervening impossibility of performance, the major difference being that
60 Treitel op cit note 13 at 840.
61 Supra note 14 at 10.
62 Ewan McKendrick Force Majeure and Frustration of Contract (1995) 50.
63 Treitel op cit note 13 at 844.
64 The Super Servant Two supra note 14 at 8.
65 Appleby v Myers (1867) LR 2 CP 651; Chandler v Webster [1904] 1 KB 493.
66 Chandler v Webster note 65.
67 Supra note 40 at 49.
68 Supra note 14 at 8.
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the theoretical basis of our South African doctrine is firmly rooted in Roman
Dutch principles of impossibility, whereas the English doctrine is an
indigenously evolved construct, operating where there has been a ‘radical
change in the obligation’. While the English law may be reluctant to grant
discharge where it is merely the common motivating foundation of the
contract which has fallen away, other jurisdictions, particularly the United
States, are more forthcoming in this regard. This provides a persuasive basis
for the inclusion in South Africa of a doctrine of suppositions as to the future.
For a proper comparison, however, the South African law on impossibility
must also be more fully examined.
III THE SOUTH AFRICAN DOCTRINE OF SUPERVENING
IMPOSSIBILITY OF PERFORMANCE
A succinct summary of the South African doctrine of supervening impossibil-
ity was handed down by the Supreme Court of Appeal in the recent Snow
Crystal case:
‘As a general rule impossibility of performance brought about by vis maior or
casus fortuitus will excuse performance of a contract. But it will not always do so.
In each case it is necessary to ‘‘look to the nature of the contract, the relation of
the parties, the circumstances of the case, and the nature of the impossibility
invoked by the defendant, to see whether the general rule ought, in the
particular circumstances of the case, to be applied.’’ The rule will not avail a
defendant if the impossibility is self-created; nor will it avail the defendant if the
impossibility is due to his or her fault.’69
This extract represents a synthesis of several leading judgments, and bears
further scrutiny. First, there are the terms vis maior and casus fortuitus: these
concepts, derived from Roman Dutch law, refer to ‘direct acts of nature, the
violence of which could not reasonably have been foreseen or guarded
against’.70 Casus fortuitus (an event occurring by chance) is a species of vis
maior (higher power). In the English jurisdiction, both types of event would
be referred to as ‘acts of God’. Thus supervening impossibility will discharge
a contract where the impossibility results from an unforeseen (and uncontrol-
lable) event (or change in circumstances).
While this may be trite today, it was not always the position in South
African law. Prior to the seminal case of Peters, Flamman & Co v Kokstad
Municipality,71 municipal courts (including the Appellate Division) had
followed the English rule of absolute contracts, as laid down in Paradine v
Jane.72 In Peters, Flamman, however, Solomon ACJ held:
69 Transnet Ltd t/a National Ports Authority v Owner of MV Snow Crystal 2008 (4) SA
111 (SCA) para 28 (authorities omitted). The quoted insert is taken from Hersman v
Shapiro 1926 TPD 367 at 373.
70 New Heriot Gold Mining Co Ltd v Union Government 1916AD 415 at 433.
71 Supra note 2.
72 Supra note 16. See Algoa Milling Co v Arkell & Douglas 1918AD 145.
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‘By the Civil Law a contract is void if at the time of its inception its performance
is impossible: impossibilium nulla obligatio (D. 50.17.185). So also where a
contract has become impossible of performance after it had been entered into
the general rule was that the position is then the same as if it had been
impossible from the beginning. . . .’73
This established authoritatively that impossibility would vitiate a contract.
As we have seen above, however, impossibility can be loosely defined to
extend to ‘commercial impossibility’ or impracticability if desired.74 The
threshold test for impossibility in SouthAfrican law must thus be examined.An
essential case to deal with in this regard is Hersman v Shapiro.75 The contract in
that case called for the delivery (at a future date) of a certain quantity and grade
of corn. In the year in question there were excessive rains in the Transvaal
region, however, and there was a resultant scarcity of corn of the required
quality. Performance for the defendant became, as a result, far more difficult
and expensive. Indeed he argued for discharge of his contractual obligation.
Stratford J held that one must ‘look to the nature of the contract, the relation of
the parties, the circumstances of the case, and the nature of the impossibility
invoked by the defendant’ to see whether the contract should be discharged.76
Evidence led in the case established that the defendant had not looked to
surrounding provinces and countries, nor had he offered ‘fanciful’ prices: the
desired grade of corn was not unobtainable, but merely scarce.77 The court
refused to discharge the defendant’s obligation.78
Hersman’s case thus seems to imply that the standard of impossibility
required in South African law for discharge is a stringent one: anything short
of absolute impossibility will not suffice. Then there are some further
qualifications: impossibility must not be subjective (or self-created);79 and
must not be due to the defendant’s fault.80 These are well established
limitations to the doctrine of supervening impossibility and (it should be
noted) are in accordance with English law. This comparative similarity was
pointed out by Solomon JA in MacDuff & Co Ltd v Johannesburg Consolidated
73 Supra note 2 at 434.
74 It should be noted that the term ‘commercial impossibility’ is used in two senses
in South Africa: first, to connote a situation of frustration of purpose; and secondly, to
indicate impracticability, as it is used here. Cf William Ramsden Supervening Impossi-
bility of Performance (1985) 74.
75 Supra note 3.
76 Ibid at 373. This extract, it will be noticed, is reproduced in the passage from the
Snow Crystal cited above, where the question was also whether performance was
indeed absolutely impossible.
77 Ibid at 375–7.
78 Ibid.
79 South African Forestry Co Ltd v York Timbers Ltd 2005 (3) SA 323 (SCA) paras
23–5. This is the authority cited for this proposition in the extract from the Snow
Crystal reproduced above.
80 MacDuff & Co Ltd (In Liquidation) v Johannesburg Consolidated Investment Co Ltd
1924AD 573 at 601.Again this is the authority cited in Snow Crystal.
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Investment Co Ltd.81 Finally, the effect of supervening impossibility is to
terminate the contractual relationship ex tunc: the contract becomes void ab
initio.82 Any performance made prior to discharge must be claimed back on
the basis of unjustified enrichment.83
IV EVIDENCE OF THE DOCTRINE OF FRUSTRATION IN
SOUTH AFRICAN LAW
Despite their disparate roots, it can be seen that in certain respects the
doctrines of frustration and supervening impossibility are analogous. Cer-
tainly any event that meets the test of impossibility in South African law
would probably be considered a frustrating event were English law to be
applied to the dispute. This similarity has been remarked upon by the
Appellate Division: ‘While the English law of frustration differs from the
South African law of impossibility of performance in certain respects, there is
also a strong degree of similarity. . . .’84
There are certain very important differences between the two doctrines,
though, which centre around the fact that frustration also covers changed
circumstances, whereas supervening impossibility deals with absolute (or
objective) impossibility. This difference is most visible when dealing with the
English doctrine of frustration of purpose. As stated above, Krell v Henry is
authority in English law for the proposition that when the common
foundation of a contract falls away, the contract falls away with it.85 While
this is at odds with the notion of impossibility, it can (as pointed out in the
introduction) be seen as being analogous to the supposition in futuro. There
is a certain amount of case authority for a Krell v Henry-type proposition in
South Africa, yet most of it has chosen to focus on expanding the notion of
impossibility rather than on developing the concept of suppositions. Typi-
cally the decisions in these cases have then been stumped by the incompati-
bility of Roman Dutch impossibility and the English concept of frustration of
purpose. Their solution: refer directly to English authority to resolve the
incongruity. The result (by implication) is an attempted transplantation of the
doctrine of frustration to South Africa. The status and merit of these cases will
now be considered in an attempt to examine the extent to which frustration
has been taken up into South African law.86
First and foremost is the case of African Realty Trust Ltd v Holmes.87 In that
case a contract for the purchase of agricultural land made provision for the
81 Ibid.
82 Peters, Flamman & Co v Kokstad Municipality supra note 2 at 434.
83 R H Christie The Law of Contract in South Africa (2006) 472.
84 Nuclear Fuels Corporation of SA (Pty) Ltd v Orda AG 1996 (4) SA 1190 (A) at
1214C.
85 Supra note 17 at 754.
86 It should be noted at the outset that this is directly contrary to the opinion of
Professor Christie, who argues that ‘it is difficult to raise enthusiasm’ for the clausula
rebus sic stantibus or the supposition as to a future state of affairs. See Christie op cit
note 83 at 473. The opinion of the present author is less conservative (see below).
87 1922AD 389.
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construction of a rock-fill dam on the nearby river by the relevant
government board. After the conclusion of the contract, the director of that
board changed and a new decision was taken rather to build a concrete dam.
This would cost nearly twice as much and would greatly increase the cost of
water to be used on the land being purchased. The buyer sought to resile
from the contract. De Villiers JA, in a separate concurring judgment,
embarked upon a lengthy discussion beginning with the statement: ‘There is
authority for the proposition that when the basis of a contract falls away the
contract falls away with it.’88
The authority to which the Judge of Appeal was referring was particularly
English authority in the form of Krell v Henry, as well as certain civil law
authorities, including the writing of the German Pandectist Windscheid.89
De Villiers JA qualified this discussion, however, with the statement that the
court was not concerned with the motives which caused a party to contract,
except to the extent that these had been incorporated expressly or by
implication into the contract.90 This discussion was in any event obiter, since
De Villiers JA opined that the contract made provision for a change in
circumstances and was thus binding.91
In MacDuff & Co Ltd v Johannesburg Consolidated Investment Co Ltd there
was again consideration of the doctrine of frustration by the Appellate
Division.92 In that case the respondent had undertaken to take over the
running of the appellant company, which had been placed in liquidation.
The business of MacDuff Ltd was the import and export of coal, but a
subsequent slump in the coal market meant that honouring this agreement
would have led to significant losses for the respondent. The respondent
pleaded in its defence that performance of the agreement had become
impossible: in the broad sense that a change of circumstances had rendered
the venture commercially impracticable.93
The essence of this defence was that a contract becomes impossible of
performance where the state of affairs on which it rests ceases to exist.94
Solomon JA quoted from the Tamplin Steamship Co case95 in support of this
contention: this case, it will be remembered, is the classic statement of the
implied term approach to frustration in English law.96 The Judge of Appeal
noted that there was no authority for this argument in South African law
88 Ibid at 400.
89 Ibid at 400–2. Windscheid’s doctrine of Voraussetzung dealt with suppositions
in contract and is briefly considered in an earlier article by this author: Hutchison op
cit note 6 at 443–4.
90 Ibid at 403.
91 Ibid at 403–4.
92 Supra note 80 at 602–3.
93 Ibid at 600. This defence is discussed by Solomon JAat 600–7.
94 Ibid at 602–3.
95 Supra note 52.
96 MacDuff supra note 80 at 603.
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outside of Schlengemann v Meyer, Bridgens & Co,97 but assumed it nevertheless
to be good law. This finding in MacDuff was also obiter, however, since
Solomon JA held that this was a case of ‘commercial’ impossibility: increased
expense in performance did not discharge the obligation.98 This was decided
with reference to English authority.99
These two cases are the major Appellate Division pronouncements on the
status of frustration in South African law. Neither was decisive of the case in
question and the defence of change of circumstances does not seem to have
been adopted beyond this. References to frustration continued in the
provincial divisions, however. These must now be examined.
Schlengemann’s case is an example of a situation where a South African court
relied on the doctrine of frustration to decide a case.100 Here the plaintiff had
been interned as an enemy subject during World War One and his continued
performance in his role as a director of the defendant company had been
suspended. The defendant had in the meantime replaced him and argued that
the relevant change in circumstances had terminated the agreement on which
the plaintiff’s directorship had been based. In reaching his decision, Gardiner J
held that the English authorities had to be relied on in such an instance of
changed circumstances, since these English principles were at the ‘root of any
contract’.101 He then cited the passage from the Tamplin Steamship case, which
Solomon JA had later echoed in MacDuff: where a state of affairs on which a
contract rests comes to an end, the contract becomes void due to an implied
term to this effect.102 The Tamplin Steamship case was shown to be relevant
since in that case too a state of war had upset the peace time status quo, and the
supervening war time state of affairs was presumed by law to be of indefinite
duration.103 The termination of the peace time circumstances, which meant
that Schlengemann was no longer capable of serving as a managing director,
likewise terminated the contract.104 The ultimate reason given for this
decision, however, was ‘impossibility of performance’.105 The reliance by
Gardiner J on frustration thus seems, with respect, to have been unnecessary
since the internment of Schlengemann seems to constitute casus fortuitus, as
did the internment of a German subject in Peters, Flamman. The case does,
however, demonstrate a tendency of South African courts to be influenced by
the English doctrine of frustration.
97 1920 CPD 494. This case is discussed further below.
98 MacDuff supra note 80 at 605–6.
99 Tennants Ltd v CS Wilson & Co Ltd supra note 43.
100 Supra note 97.
101 Ibid at 500–1.
102 Ibid.
103 See the discussion of this case in the Schlengemann judgment supra note 97 at
502.
104 Ibid at 504.
105 Ibid.
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In the 1940s Herbstein J used the same passage from another English
frustration case, Hirji Mulji v Cheong Yue Steamship Co Ltd,106 to decide two
separate cases. The passage in question was a largely unremarkable statement
of the doctrine of frustration, to the effect that if an unforeseen event
frustrates the common object of two contracting parties, the contract must
come to an end. This was because holding a party bound under such changed
circumstances would be to hold him to a contract which he had never
made.107 In both cases where he cites this passage, Herbstein J seems, with
respect, to ignore the fact that impossibility in South African law does not
equate with frustration in English law. Herbstein J directly invokes English
authority in order to assert that impossibility of performance results in
discharge of a contract.
In the first case, Benjamin v Myers,108 the defendant was prevented from
maintaining the petrol supply on his garage premises — something which
was required in terms of the lease. Although this was beyond the defendant’s
control due to a refusal of the relevant authorities to supply him with petrol,
this impossibility was held to have been self-created through his prior breach
of petrol supply restrictions under a War Measure.109 As a separate ground for
this decision Herbstein J argued that since the defendant wanted only to find
the obligation to maintain a supply of petrol discharged, but otherwise to
keep the lease agreement intact, this was an attempt to hold the plaintiff to a
new agreement following a change of circumstances.110 Herbstein J rejected
the defendant’s argument: his judgment seems to suggest that a finding that
impossibility was present would require the whole agreement to be dis-
charged, and not merely one term thereof. Since the defendant was
attempting to uphold part of the agreement, but discharge the rest, his
argument was bad in law.
Herbstein J’s judgment in Rossouw v Haumann111 was another instance of
reliance on the doctrine of frustration. After he had found that the agreement
in question was impossible of performance, the judge went on to set out the
consequences of this finding.112 Instead of quoting a South African case such
as Peters, Flamman, however, he quoted the extract from Hirji Mulji referred
to above. Thus, instead of following established South African precedent on
impossibility, he chose to invoke the doctrine of frustration. His authority for
this was his own finding in Benjamin v Myers.113
106 [1926]AC 497.
107 This is a paraphrased summary of the extract which appears in Hirji Mulji supra
note 106 at 507. Herbstein J cites this passage in Benjamin v Myers 1946 CPD 655 at
662–3 and then again in Rossouw v Haumann 1949 (4) SA796 (C) at 799–800.
108 Supra note 107.
109 Ibid at 662.
110 Ibid at 663.
111 Supra note 107.
112 Ibid at 799.
113 Ibid at 800.
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It is submitted that neither of the findings of Herbstein J establishes a
strong precedent. In Benjamin v Myers, the frustration ruling was only
peripheral, and in Rossouw v Haumann Herbstein J seems, with respect, to
have looked beyond the permissible sources of South African law on
supervening impossibility. In any event, neither case is a true example of the
frustration of purpose-type scenario.
The next case is slightly more in point, though. Bischofberger v Van Eyk dealt
with a dispute based on a contract for the sale of property.114 Part of the
purchase price was to be raised by the sale of another property that was
indirectly owned by the purchaser. The sale of this second property fell
through, and it became impossible for the purchaser to meet the purchase price
on his first agreement. Boshoff JP held that when the source of the purchaser’s
funding fell away, his obligation to purchase did as well.115 The basis for this
finding was impossibility of performance (Peters, Flamman and Hersman v
Shapiro were cited in support of this finding).116 The Judge President went on
to state, however, that English law did not seem to be at variance with South
African law in this regard. He cited Morgan v Manser117 to the effect that an
unforeseen, fundamental change in circumstances renders a contract void.118
The judge concluded that the change in circumstances regarding the availabil-
ity of funds to pay the purchase price was unforeseen and made performance
impossible.119 As a result the agreement ceased to exist.
The problem facing Boshoff JP in Bischofberger seems to have been the
nature of the impossibility involved. The purchaser’s inability to pay did not
render the agreement objectively impossible; the impossibility was as a result
of his own subjective circumstances. This no doubt motivated the court to
look beyond South African law for a doctrine which voided a contract for a
mere change of circumstances, rather than a doctrine that required objective
(or absolute) impossibility. It is submitted that this would have been a good
case to have decided on the basis of a supposition: the source of the funding
could (arguably) be seen as a common assumption between the parties, and
the failure of the funding to materialise would then render the contract void.
The problem with this construction, however, is that the supposition would
relate to the future, which is not favoured in South African law.120
The final case in favour of frustration (to be examined here) is Kok v
Osborne.121 This case involved a fairly complicated set of frauds committed by
a conman, Hobson-Jones. The net result of these was that Hobson-Jones’s
creditor, Kok, was substituted for himself as the purchaser of a property
belonging to Osborne. Kok believed that she was receiving title in settlement
114 1981 (2) SA607 (W).
115 Ibid at 610G.
116 Ibid at 610H–611A.
117 [1947] 2All ER 666 at 670.
118 Bischofberger supra note 114 at 611D–F.
119 Ibid at 611F–H.
120 Van Reenen Steel supra note 5 para 8.
121 1993 (4) SA788 (SEC).
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of Hobson-Jones’s debt to her. Osborne believed that Kok was the joint
purchaser along with Hobson-Jones and would be the source of the purchase
price. Hobson-Jones had no intention of paying for the property, but Kok
believed that Hobson-Jones had already paid and that she would be receiving
title. When Hobson-Jones’s fraud emerged, it became clear that no one
would be paying the purchase price. Osborne then resold the property to
another buyer. Kok tried to interdict transfer, arguing that title was due to
her.
Jones J found the contract to be invalid on two grounds: one was a
unilateral mistake on the part of Osborne,122 and the other was a failed
common assumption of both parties that Hobson-Jones had paid Osborne
under the contract of sale.123 This reasoning on the second ground was
flawed from the outset, since this was the assumption of Kok alone; Osborne
did not share in the delusion.124 Jones J did not follow the conventional
approach to suppositions, however. Rather he stated that the problem of the
false assumption could be solved by an application of ‘the rule in Peters,
Flamman . . . and African Realty Trust. . .’.125 The judge took the wording of
this ‘rule’ from Professor Kerr’s Principles of the Law of Contract:
‘The basic rule is that if during the currency of a contract the conditions
necessary for its operation cease to exist, the change not being due to the fault of
either party or to a factor for which either party bears the risk, the contract
ceases to exist.’126
Jones J went on to state:
‘The law recognises that the realities of the world of business demand that
provision be made for a situation where unforeseen contingencies prevent the
attainment of the commercial purpose which the parties had in mind when
they contracted. That, too, can amount to legal impossibility.’127
The judge then cited African Realty Trust to the effect that when the basis of
a contract falls away, the contract falls away with it.128 He stated further that
‘commercial impossibility’ as evidenced in Krell v Henry had been accepted by
a number of South African courts.129 Examples given of such decisions were
Bischofberger v Van Eyk, Williams v Evans130 and Rossouw v Haumann.131 Jones J
122 Ibid at 801D.
123 Ibid at 801E–H.
124 This is pointed out by WA Ramsden ‘Could performance have been impossible
in Kok v Osborne & another?’ (1994) 6 SA Merc LJ 340 at 341–2.
125 Kok supra note 121 at 801J–802A.
126 A J Kerr Principles of the Law of Contract 6 ed (2002) 545. The passage is cited in
the judgment at 802B–C.
127 Kok supra note 121 at 802D.
128 Ibid at 802E–G. The relevant passage from African Realty Trust appears at 400 in
that judgment and was discussed above.
129 Ibid at 802G.
130 1978 (1) SA 1170 (C). This is the seminal case on suppositions in futuro and is
discussed at length in Hutchison op cit note 6.
131 Kok supra note 121 at 802–4.
THE SOUTH AFRICAN LAW JOURNAL102
JOBNAME: SALJ10 Part1 PAGE: 20 SESS: 2 OUTPUT: Mon May 17 15:27:16 2010
/dtp22/juta/juta/SALJ−2010−Part1/02article
concluded that the rule as to impossibility which he had adopted was
applicable to this case, in accordance with the authority which he had cited:
the basis of the agreement (payment by Hobson-Jones) had failed and
therefore the contract failed.132
The judgment in this case has been criticised by several commentators, and
their criticism appears to be justified.133 Jones J chose to follow neither the
path of a failed common assumption nor supervening impossibility as they are
understood in South African law. No doubt this is because the impossibility
was not absolute and the assumption was not commonly held. Rather, the
judge seems to follow the English doctrine of frustration of purpose, seeking
to capture the problem under the broad banner of changed circumstances.134
It is doubtful whether this is even a true case of change of circumstances at all:
the fraud of Hobson-Jones was present from the outset. It is submitted that
the many flaws in the reasoning of this judgment make it weak authority for
the doctrine of frustration of purpose in South African law.
The picture which has emerged is that there is no compelling evidence for
the adoption of the doctrine of frustration, or more particularly frustration of
purpose, into South African law: certainly not by precedent. The Appellate
Division comments on the matter are old and in any event obiter. The
provincial decisions are largely based on flawed reasoning and are in any
event not supported by binding authority. It appears that any argument that
frustration is already part of South African law must for this reason fail. To
strengthen this conclusion there are several dicta by South African courts
which unequivocally deny that frustration forms any part of South African
law. The most recent (and elaborate) of these was in Techni-Pak Sales (Pty) Ltd
v Hall.135 In that case an argument based on the doctrine of frustration was
raised by the plaintiff. Colman J discussed the doctrine of frustration,136 but
noted that if frustration could be invoked where there was no implied term
that circumstances would remain unchanged, ‘the granite concept of sanctity
of contracts [would] be shattered’.137 The judge summed up:
‘In our Courts the doctrine of frustration has upon occasion been referred to by
that name, but it is not clear to me that it has ever been applied to a situation
which was not covered also by one or other of our more familiar rules relating
to implied term [sic] or impossibility of performance. Counsel have not been
able to refer me to any case in which one of our Courts has assumed the type of
broad equitable jurisdiction which Courts of England are said to have in respect
of frustration.’138
132 Ibid at 804H–I.
133 C-J Pretorius and T B Floyd ‘Mistake and supervening impossibility of perfor-
mance’ (1994) 57 THRHR 325; Ramsden op cit note 124.
134 This is supported by Jones J’s invocation of African Realty Trust and Krell v Henry.
135 1968 (3) SA231 (W). See also Bayley v Harwood 1953 (3) SA239 (T) at 244C–D;
Grobbelaar v Bosch 1964 (3) SA687 (E) at 690H–691B.
136 Techni-Pak Sales supra note 136 at 238C–F.
137 Ibid at 238G.
138 Ibid at 238H.
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V THE SUITABILITY OF THE DOCTRINE OF FRUSTRATION
FOR USE IN SOUTH AFRICAN LAW
What should by now be clear is that the doctrine of frustration is not part of
South African law. To an extent our law of impossibility overlaps with the
English doctrine, but frustration differs fundamentally in that it deals with
changes in circumstances rather than impossibility alone. The cases in South
Africa which deal with frustration perhaps do not provide the best examples
of changed circumstances, but these judgments do evidence the lacuna in our
law in this regard. While a doctrine which addresses the problem of changed
circumstances can be of assistance in times of war, hyper-inflation, change in
political regime and any other unforeseen contingency which makes strict
enforcement of the contract unjust, a narrowly conceived doctrine of
impossibility is of limited use. The requirement of absolute impossibility
means that where performance is still possible it must be enforced, no matter
how dire the consequences for the afflicted party. Indeed, it could well be
argued that South Africa’s refusal to recognise a doctrine of changed
circumstances is evidence of a lack of national catastrophes, as well as an
avoidance of the demands of justice.139 Such an argument could easily be
based on the notion of fairness which underpins chapter two of the South
African Constitution. Where there has been a fundamental alteration in the
cost or value of contract performance, which is of a sufficient order of
magnitude to warrant intervention, it would not be fair to place the cost of
such a change in circumstances wholly on the disadvantaged party, and the
spirit of the Constitution would demand intervention.
What this article does not advocate is a wholesale legal transplantation of
the doctrine of frustration from English law, or any other legal system. What
this article attempts to show, however, is that South Africa lags behind other
major jurisdictions, as our legal system has no mechanism for ensuring that
justice is done where there is a contractual dispute arising out of a change of
circumstances. The recent decision of the South African Constitutional
Court in Barkhuizen v Napier140 evidenced the beginning of a shift away from
public policy favouring freedom of contract alone to a broader conception
— zone which recognises fairness in contracting as an important ideal. This is
necessitated by s 39(2) of the Constitution, which calls for the development
of the common law to reflect the values in the Bill of Rights. A strong
argument can be made that fairness in contracting demands that the issue of
139 It should be noted, however, that the South African Law Commission proposed
legislation to deal with this issue in its 1998 Report on Project 47 Unreasonable Stipula-
tions in Contracts and the Rectification of Contracts. The draft Bill on the Control of
Unreasonableness, Unconscionableness or Oppressiveness in Contracts or Terms
included a provision at clause 4, which is similar in effect to the hardship provisions of
the PICC, allowing for renegotiation or judicial adaptation of the contract should
performance of a contract become ‘excessively onerous because of a change in cir-
cumstances’. This Bill has never been enacted, however.
140 2007 (5) SA323 (CC).
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change of circumstances in contract law be addressed.141 Fairness in contract-
ing could then stand either as an independent ground for intervention in
contracts, as Barkhuizen implies,142 or could serve as the ‘aanknopingspunt’
for a more technical doctrine to deal with changed circumstances.
In looking for a solution to this problem our courts would be well advised
to consider the doctrine of frustration in English law, as well as the separate
developments which this doctrine has undergone in other countries which
recognise the English system as their parent. English law does, however,
seem to be quite severe when dealing with changed circumstances and,
although this system recognises frustration of purpose, we have seen that
courts in that country are very hesitant to invoke this rule. Similarly the
converse — impracticability — is not a favoured concept. It can thus be said
that the English courts also tend to favour contractual certainty over fairness,
and their conservative approach to the problem of changed circumstances is
not that different from the one found in South Africa. The important point,
however, is that their doctrine (at least in theory) is one of changed
circumstances, whereas ours is one of impossibility alone.
By contrast, the United States, despite being a commercial powerhouse, is
far more liberal in permitting discharge due to changed circumstances.
Legislation in that country makes provision not only for frustration of
purpose, but also for impracticability.143 The fact that frustration type
doctrines do not spell the end for commerce is reflected in the incorporation
of rules on hardship into the Unidroit Principles of International Commer-
cial Contracts.144 Indeed, the opposite is true: changed circumstances are a
natural feature of international trade and the global market requires that
contract law be able to take account of these. In this regard it should be noted
that the Unidroit PICC rules on hardship go much further than English — or
even US — law and permit renegotiation of a contract by the parties, or even
the adaptation thereof by a court, following a fundamental change in
circumstances.145 From a commercial point of view it can hardly be doubted
that this is preferable to the all-or-nothing approach of English law.
South African law on impossibility has a common ancestor with England’s
frustration, namely the Roman law rules on impossibility. Although the
development of these concepts have taken different paths in these two
141 See for an argument along these lines: L F Van Huyssteen and Schalk van der
Merwe ‘Good faith in contract: proper behaviour amidst changing circumstances’
(1990) 1 Stellenbosch LR 244.
142 For an argument in this regard, see Graham Glover ‘Lazarus in the Constitu-
tional Court: an exhumation of the exceptio doli generalis?’ (2007) 124 SALJ 449 and
AJ Kerr ‘The defence of unfair conduct on the part of the plaintiff at the time action is
brought: the exceptio doli generalis and the replicatio doli in modern law’ (2008) 125
SALJ 241.
143 Compare generally: Joseph Perillo Calamari and Perillo on Contracts 6 ed (2009)
ch 13.
144 Unidroit PICC arts 6.2.1–3.
145 Unidroit PICC art 6.2.3.
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countries (and indeed in all the other countries to which impossibility or
frustration have been exported), links remain between our systems. This
should provide the degree of relevance necessary to take account of foreign
law on change of circumstances and to develop the indigenous Roman-
Dutch law of impossibility to bring it into line with modern trends.
VI CONCLUSION
The aim of this article was to compare the English doctrine of frustration
with the equivalent South African notion of impossibility. In the past, South
African courts faced with problems of changed circumstances which could
not be dealt with under the banner of impossibility have sought to invoke the
doctrine of frustration to resolve the disputes before them. This invocation
was shown to have no authoritative basis in South African law and
accordingly to be invalid. This does not, however, answer the hypothetical
question whether South Africa should broaden its impossibility defence to
incorporate discharge for changed circumstances. It is submitted that this
would be a beneficial move and would be in the interests of justice. Despite
being controversial, under appropriate circumstances a concept such as
frustration of purpose could be useful in providing a solution to difficult
moral dilemmas concerning the enforcement of a contract affected by
unforeseen hardship. Of course one must ensure that the prior allocation of
risks under a contract is not unnecessarily disturbed, but injustice could result
if courts were dogmatically to refuse to recognise that a change of circum-
stances could not justify discharge of performance in certain (albeit carefully
circumscribed) cases.
The difficult issue then is how are we to overcome our common law and
introduce such a rule. One method, of course would be legislation.146
Another would be by means of equitable intervention under the doctrine of
public policy or good faith. If one were to develop the common law, then
perhaps the doctrine of frustration of purpose could underpin our indigenous
notion of the supposition in futuro, whether in the Williams v Evans guise, or
as an imputed tacit resolutive condition. Clearly the days of transplants from
English law are over in South Africa. The time has come, however, to take
account of foreign developments and develop our contract law to accommo-
date the problem of changed circumstances.
146 Such as along the lines proposed in the 1998 South African Law Commission
draft Bill. Compare also in this regard s 48 of the Consumer Protection Act 68 of
2008. This section gives courts the power to set aside unfair contract terms within the
sphere of application of the Act. This is a fairly broad power, the limits of which have
yet to be defined by the courts. It is the opinion of this author that this section merely
codifies (for the consumer context) the headway which was made in Barkhuizen v
Napier supra note 1. See also s 40 of the Act which prohibits ‘unconscionable con-
duct’ in (inter alia) the ‘negotiation, conclusion, execution or enforcement’ of a
consumer agreement.
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